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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of allocation of decision rights between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries, and the economic consequence of suboptimal power structure. 
Based on China’s unique double-disclosure for the parent company and the whole group, we 
construct a decentralization index to measure how decision rights are allocated within the 
group companies. We find a more decentralized (centralized) power structure for the groups 
with more uncertain (certain) external environment and with poorer (better) internal 
information quality. We also show that the groups with suboptimal power structure have 
weaker future performance. 
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Allocation of Decision Rights between the Parent Company and its Subsidiaries 
 
Introduction 
Companies tend to have different organizational structures (in other words, power 
structures) that prescribe decision rights.1 In some companies, decision rights are centralized 
so that top managers (such as the CEO) retain control over almost all important decisions, 
whereas in other companies rights are decentralized to lower managers (Melumad & 
Reichelstein, 1987). 
Hayek (1945) emphasizes the importance of the collocation of decision rights with 
specific knowledge for decision-making. However, delegating decision rights to lower-level 
managers introduces the risk of possible agency problems.  When determining their power 
structure, companies usually make a trade-off between the agency costs arising from conflicts 
of interest associated with decentralization, and the costs that arise from poor information 
associated with centralization (Jensen & Meckling, 1992). In this study, we examine the 
determinants of the allocation of decision rights between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries, and the economic consequence of a suboptimal power structure. 
We use a sample of Chinese listed group companies to study this issue. In China, listed 
groups are required to provide not only consolidated financial statements for the group, but 
also separate financial statements for the parent company. Taking advantage of this double 
disclosure, we construct a decentralization index (DI) based on operating activities to 
measure the allocation of decision rights between the parent company and its subsidiaries. 
When the parent company executes purchases and sales on behalf of the whole group, the 
decision rights for major operating activities are more likely to be concentrated in the parent 
company. In contrast, when the subsidiaries execute purchases and sales independently, the 
                                                                 
1 For ease of exposition, we use power structure and allocation of decision rights interchangeably. 
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decision rights are more likely to be delegated to the subsidiaries.2 
Our empirical results show that groups operating in more uncertain business 
environments tend to be decentralized, i.e., they are more likely to assign decision rights to 
the subsidiaries due to the demand for specific knowledge for decision-making. Groups with 
high-quality internal information prefer a centralized structure because the effective 
communication within the group can facilitate decision-making by the parent company. The 
evidence strongly supports the prediction that the power structure within a group is 
significantly affected by both external and internal environments. Moreover, we also examine 
the economic consequence of power structures and find that groups in which the power 
structure is mismatched to the environment have weaker future performance. The evidence 
suggests the important role of an efficient power structure. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, the question of how 
decision rights should be allocated within the group company is an important matter of 
corporate policy that has attracted the interest of researchers from the economics, 
management and finance fields (see, e.g., Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 
1992; Harris & Raviv, 2005; Rantakari, 2013). However, most researchers explore this issue 
through mathematical modeling (e.g., Harris & Raviv, 2005; Rantakari, 2013) or surveys (e.g., 
Bloom, Sadun & Van Reenen, 2012; Christie, Joye & Watts, 2003; Graham et al., 2015). By 
providing empirical evidence based on a large sample of group companies, we shed light on 
this area. 
Second, making use of China’s double disclosure, we develop a novel proxy for the 
allocation of decision rights between a parent company and its subsidiary. Our measure uses 
unique information obtained from the separately disclosed financial statements of the parent 
company and the whole group. This measure, though rough, relies on audited financial 
                                                                 
2 As a robustness test, we also construct alternative measures of decentralization based on investing activities. 
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information and is therefore not affected by the subjective judgments of managers or 
researchers. In the extant literature, Robinsen and Stocken (2013) construct a measure of 
power structure in international companies, and Csaszar (2012) does so for mutual funds. 
Compared with their measures, our measure is more externally generalizable, as it is 
available for a large sample of companies, including both small and large ones, and covers 
more industries. 
Third, our study is related to the literature on internal information environments. A good 
internal information environment can provide top management with timely information and 
improve the efficiency of management decisions (Horngren, Datar, Foster, Rajan & Ittner, 
2012). Previous studies have noted the importance of high-quality internal information and 
documented its effects on a variety of corporate decisions, such as management forecasts 
(Dorantes, Li, Peters & Richardson, 2013) and tax avoidance (Gallemore & Labro, 2015). 
Our study extends this line of research and documents the relation between internal 
information and power structure. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. A “Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development” section is followed by the “Decentralization Index” section, which describes 
our measure of decentralization. This is followed by the “Research Design” section and the 
“Empirical Results” section. An “Additional Analyses” section reports the robustness tests 
and additional analyses, and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Literature Review 
As Hayek (1945) notes, the economic problem that a society must solve is how to secure 
the best use of resources known to members of the society. Hayek emphasizes that the 
ultimate decision rights must rest with those people who are familiar with the particular 
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circumstances of time and place, in other words, those who have information relevant to 
making decisions. Therefore, decision rights should be allocated to different people and a 
decentralized organization is generally preferable. 
Hayek’s pioneering view is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1992), whose analysis 
shows that the delegation of decision rights to those at lower levels of an organization who 
have relevant information for the decision can reduce the costs arising from poor information. 
However, they also suggest that lower- level agents may not act in the best interest of top 
management, and agency costs resulting from conflicts of interest inevitably increase as the 
company adopts a more decentralized structure. Therefore, companies should trade off the 
costs associated with poor information and those associated with agency problems when 
determining their optimal level of decentralization. 
Along this line, Stein (2002) argues that when information is “soft” and cannot be 
credibly transmitted, a decentralized company performs better. His paper highlights the 
importance of information communication. Harris and Raviv (2005) build a theoretical model 
and show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of division 
managers’ private information and decreases with that of CEOs. Furthermore, Rantakari 
(2013) demonstrates that organizations operating in volatile environments prefer 
decentralized decision-making. These theoretical models provide a framework for 
determining the allocation of decision rights. 
Besides the theoretical models, several papers have empirically examined power 
structures within companies. Colombo and Delmastro (2004) analyze a sample of 438 Italian 
manufacturing plants and their parent companies. They show that the complexity and size of 
organizations, the urgency of decisions, and the use of advanced communication technologies 
are positively associated with the degree of decentralization. In addition, companies that are 
younger, closer to the technological frontier, and in more heterogeneous environments are 
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more likely to choose a decentralized structure because they have less public information and 
the benefit of lower-ranking managers’ information outweighs agency costs (Daron, Aghion, 
Lelarge, Reenen & Zilibotti, 2007). Using survey data, Graham et al. (2015) find that 
depending on the nature of the decisions, CEOs have different preferences for allocating 
rights; for example, decisions about mergers and acquisitions are less likely to be delegated 
than those about capital structure. Other studies document that the product market, the 
company’s involvement in international trade, and the social trust in a region also play 
important roles in determining the power structure within a company (Bloom et al., 2012; 
Meagher & Wait, 2013). 
In summary, the allocation of decision rights is an important issue that has attracted 
attention from researchers. Nonetheless, due to the difficulty of empirically measuring the 
power structure in an organization, extant studies mainly use theoretical models, survey data, 
or small samples to conduct their investigations. An empirical study based on a large sample 
is thus warranted. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
External environment. It has long been argued in the management literature that 
companies should choose organizational structures that match their environment (e.g., 
Chandler, 1962; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1986). Companies generally operate in an uncertain 
business environment. The unpredictable behavior of customers, suppliers, competitors, and 
regulatory parties contributes to environmental uncertainty (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). 
Intuitively, companies should react accordingly to changes in the external environment. For 
example, a change in customers’ preferences may drive a company to adjust its product 
design, or a change in regulations may push a company to adjust its marketing strategy. When 
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a company faces great uncertainty, the value of local responsiveness and local information 
increases. A principal will prefer to delegate decisions to a better informed agent, because the 
communication between top management and lower management is often noisy (Dessein, 
2002) and a decentralized structure can facilitate faster reactions from the company. Similarly, 
Rantakari (2013) claims theoretically that organizations operating in volatile environments 
prefer decentralized decision-making. 
Based on the above discussion, we expect that a group company within a volatile 
environment will value the local information of its subsidiaries, and will therefore delegate 
more decisions to the subsidiaries. Our first hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 1. Group companies with higher environmental uncertainty have a more 
decentralized power structure. 
 
Internal environment. When companies have a centralized power structure, to facilitate 
better decision-making, top managers will need low-level managers to provide relevant 
information. However, barriers always exist in the transfer of information, which makes 
communication noisy and causes information loss that may prevent top managers from 
efficient decision-making (Bloom et al., 2012; Dessein, 2002). Timely and accurate 
communication between top and low-level managers therefore becomes essential for 
centralization, which can be warranted by high-quality internal information. The quality of 
internal information determines the accessibility and accuracy of the data and knowledge 
collected, generated, and consumed within an organization (Gallemore & Labro, 2015). Top 
managers in a company with high-quality internal information have timely access to accurate 
information for better decision-making (Hodge, Kennedy & Maines, 2004). 
In the context of group companies, because good-quality internal information can ensure 
better decision-making associated with effective communication between the parent company 
7 
 
and its subsidiaries, it is more likely that a more centralized structure will be adopted by 
groups with better internal information. The hypothesis is formalized as follows. 
Hypothesis 2. Group companies with high-quality internal information have a more 
centralized power structure. 
 
Suboptimal power structure. According to the discussions above, companies should 
decide the appropriate level of centralization by trading off the costs arising from poor 
information against those arising from agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Dessein, 
2002). Companies with different external environments and different internal information 
qualities will choose different power structures. A natural question then arises concerning the 
economic consequences of a suboptimal power structure. Intuitively, deviation from the 
optimal structure will give the wrong people excessive power and lead to inefficient decisions: 
top managers may make inefficient decisions due to poor information, or lower-level 
managers may do this because of conflicts of interest. These inefficient decisions inevitably 
lead to weaker performance. 
For example, Robinson and Stocken (2013) study a group of multinational companies 
and find that a mismatched power structure between foreign segments and headquarters is 
associated with weak performance. They also find that multinational companies are more 
likely to adjust the allocation of decision rights to foreign segments if the extent of the 
mismatch is large. Furthermore, Csaszar (2012) documents that when there is an 
overdecentralized structure, mutual funds are more likely to pursue bad projects and miss 
good ones. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that group companies should decide their power structures 
according to environmental factors. If the allocation of decision rights does not match well 
with the companies’ environments, future performance will be adversely affected. We 
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summarize our third hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 3. Group companies with a suboptimal power structure are more likely to 
experience poor future performance. 
 
Decentralization Index 
Measuring the power structure within a company is not easy. One instrument that has 
been used in the literature is the relative proportion of profit and cost centers at the 
management level. Presumably, managers of profit centers have more decision rights than 
those of cost centers. Therefore, companies with more profit centers are more decentralized 
than companies with more cost centers (see, for example, Christie et al., 2003; Daron et al., 
2007). Other studies use survey data and directly contact CEOs or managers for related 
information via questionnaires or interviews (see for example, Colombo & Delmastro, 2004; 
Graham et al., 2015; Bloom et al., 2012). Robinson and Stocken (2013) rely on the 
accounting rules for U.S.-based multinational companies to identify their allocation of 
decision rights to foreign segments. Specifically, when the foreign affiliate’s functional 
currency is the host country’s currency, decision rights are regarded as being delegated; when 
its functional currency is U.S. dollar, decision rights are retained by the parent company. The 
advantage of this measure is that it is based on public information. However, it is only 
available for multinational companies and can only be used to measure the power allocation 
between foreign segments and the domestic headquarters. 
Our measure of power structure is also based on publicly available information. In China, 
listed group companies are required by the regulators to provide not only consolidated 
financial statements for the group, but also separate financial statements for the parent 
company. Therefore, we can access information specific to the parent company. Taking 
advantage of this double disclosure, we construct a decentralization index, denoted as DI, to 
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measure the power structure of the group company, i.e., how a group company allocates 
decision rights between the parent company and its subsidiaries. The formula for DI is stated 
as follows. 
𝐷𝐼 = −{
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡′ 𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
∗ 0.5 +
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ′ 𝑠 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
∗ 0.5 −
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡′ 𝑠  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
}, 
where operating expenses are the sum of the cost of goods sold, SGA (selling, general, 
and administrative) expenses, and sales tax; operating assets are the sum of inventories, 
prepaid expenses, PPE (property, plant, and equipment), and intangible assets. 
A company’s major profit-maximizing operating activities are producing goods and 
providing services. When a company has multiple divisions, it usually practices centralized 
purchasing; i.e., the parent company purchases key supply items for common use by all of its 
divisions (Corey, 1978). According to Karjalainen (2011), centralized purchasing has synergy 
benefits including economies of scale, economies of information and learning, and economies 
of process. Typically, the parent company makes essential purchasing decisions and takes 
responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the purchasing process, and the subsidiaries “buy” 
goods (e.g., raw materials) from the parent company at an internal transfer price via the 
internal market. 
When preparing consolidated financial statements, such intra-entity transactions are 
eliminated because they are not transactions with an outside unrelated party. However, this 
practice of centralized procurement is reflected in the financial statements of the parent 
company, which record a large increase in sales and operating expenses. 
After the subsidiaries produce goods (i.e., output) using the purchased raw materials (i.e., 
input), the group companies need to sell their products to outsiders. The parent company may 
be responsible for selling all of the products produced by individual subsidiaries, which we 
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denote as centralized sales. This practice, similar to centralized purchasing, does not affect 
the consolidated financial statements, but greatly increases the sales and operating expenses 
of the parent company. 
Therefore, the underlying rationale of DI is that if a group company concentrates its 
sales activities or procurement in the parent company rather than in its subsidiaries, we can 
claim that the company concentrates the decision rights for its major operating activities in 
the parent company. In other words, it has a high (low) level of centralization 
(decentralization). The DI formula is further adjusted by subtracting relative operating assets 
owned by the parent company of the whole group, because operating assets are the main 
resources for operating activities. Note that the size of the parent company relative to its 
subsidiaries may, to a certain degree, correspond to power allocation within the group. For 
example, if a subsidiary is relatively large, this may imply that more power has been 
allocated to the subsidiary. We do not study this type of power allocation. By using relative 
size deducted, DI captures the abnormal power allocation relative to the operating resources 
owned by each group member.3 For ease of interpretation of the empirical results, we 
multiply the measure by minus one. Hence, a higher DI indicates a more decentralized power 
structure, and lower DI indicates a less decentralized power structure. 
Our DI measure has several advantages. First, it is constructed using audited financial 
statements, which are more reliable than data from private sources. Second, compared to 
survey data, it is less prone to subjective bias. In addition, the measure can be applied to all 
Chinese listed companies with subsidiaries, and is not limited to large multinational 
companies. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that DI has limitations. Organizations make 
decisions on various activities, including operating activities, investing activities, financing 
activities, and many others. An ideal measure of decentralization should cover all of these 
                                                                 
3 In other words, we classify a group whose parent company retains more operating activities relative to operating resources  
(i.e. assets), as having a more centralized structure. 
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activities, but our measure only considers purchase and sales decisions (or operating 
decisions) and does not capture control through funding or other non-operating channels. To 
address this issue, in the robustness test we construct alternative measures of decentralization 
based on investing activities and run analyses after deleting the observations with parent 
companies that only engage in investment activities. 
Furthermore, we must note that due to data limitations, we cannot identify whether sales 
(or purchases) of a parent company are performed in the market or within the group, which 
also adds some noise to the DI measure. However, DI can differentiate the degree of 
concentration if external sales or purchases by the parent company exceed its own processing 
needs (in other words, if the operating activities are concentrated toward the parent company). 
We illustrate this in Appendix A. 
 
Research Design 
Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample includes all Chinese A-share listed companies, excluding those in the 
financial industry.4 To ensure the data quality and to calculate certain variables, we use the 
2002 to 2013 sample period.5 After eliminating observations with missing data, the final 
sample consists of 16,062 firm-year observations.6 
We obtain consolidated financial statements and parent companies’ financial statements 
from RESSET/DB to calculate the proxy for decentralization, i.e., DI. Other required 
financial information, if not specified, is taken from CSMAR.7 
                                                                 
4 A-share listed companies are for domestic investors and traded in RMB; B-share stocks were originally for international 
investors. B-share stocks are now open to domestic investors, but are settled with U.S. or H.K. dollars. Some listed 
companies are traded in both A and B markets. 
5 As we need at least five years (ending in the current year) of available data to calculate certain variables, we actually use 
data starting from 1998. 
6 Our sample only includes groups with both parent company and subsidiaries. Groups with only one entity are excluded. 
7 CSMAR is the major database supporting accounting and finance research on China issues. However, CSMAR does not 
provide financial information for the parent companies. 
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Research Design 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. To test Hypothesis 1, concerning the relation between external 
environmental uncertainty (EU) and power structure, we use a proxy of EU from Ghosh and 
Olsen (2009). They argue that a volatile sales pattern across time indicates a relatively 
uncertain operating environment. Following them, we use the coefficient of variation in sales 
over the five years before current year as the measure of EU.8 
To test Hypothesis 2, concerning the relation between internal information quality (IQ) 
and power structure, we follow Gallemore and Labro (2015) and use the earnings 
announcement speed calculated as the number of days between the end of the current fiscal 
year and the group company’s earnings announcement date, divided by 365 and multiplied by 
minus one. 9  A company with high-quality internal information is likely to have a 
high-quality accounting system that is capable of quickly integrating information from 
various sources (Jennings, Hojun, & Tanlu, 2014), thus enabling the company to make earlier 
earnings announcements. 
We run the following model to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
𝐷𝐼𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽3Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   (1) 
The variables DI, EU, and IQ are defined above. We include several control variables as 
in Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2013).10 Firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Large companies tend to have more complex operations, which might affect power allocation.  
Financial leverage (Lev) is total liabilities divided by total assets. The market-to-book ratio 
(MB), is the ratio of market value of common equity divided by the book value of equity. 
                                                                 
8 To avoid survivor bias, we use all of the available data to calculate EU if companies have been listed for less than five 
years. 
9 We also use one-year lagged IQ, which does not change the results. 
10 In the main analyses, we use control variables in the concurrent year. We also use one-year lagged control variables, 
which does not change the results. 
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Firm age (Age) is the natural logarithm of the number of years that the company has been in 
business. SOE is an indicator variable for state-owned companies, which equals 1 for 
state-owned companies and 0 otherwise. 
An indicator variable for diversified companies (Diversify) is also included, and equals 1 
if companies have sales in two or more industries, and 0 otherwise (Xu, Chan, Jiang & Yi, 
2013).11 Specifically, if the parent company and its subsidiaries operate in the same business, 
the group is more likely to be centralized; if they are diversified into different lines of 
operation, the parent company may tend to allocate more power to the subsidiaries.12 We 
expect Diversify to be positively associated with DI. 
In addition, in 2007 China adopted a new set of accounting standards that substantially 
converge with IFRS (Ding & Su, 2008), and may have a positive effect on internal 
information quality (Liu, Yao, Hu & Liu, 2011). We thus include the variable After, which 
equals 1 for the years after 2007 (inclusive) and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include year and 
industry fixed effects in the model. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the mismatch between power structure and 
environmental factors has an adverse effect on firm performance. Following Robinson and 
Stocken (2013), we use the absolute value of the residuals from Equation 1, which negatively 
captures the model fitness, to measure the mismatch, denoted as AbDI. 
To formally test Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following model. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡   (2) 
                                                                 
11 The data are from the Wind Financial Database (WindDB). 
12 However, we acknowledge that due to data availability, Diversify is unable to efficiently differentiate between horizontal 
diversification and vertical integration. Horizontal diversification implies that the subsidiaries produce products or provide 
services that are often technologically or commercially unrelated to those of the parent company. Intuitively, within 
horizontally diversified groups, decisions are made independently for those unrelated products; in other words, the groups 
are more decentralized. Vertical integration implies that a group owns its upstream suppliers and its downstream buyers. The 
customer–producer relationship within the group may require centralized decision-making by the parent company. Diversify 
is defined based on whether a company runs business across different industries, and this construct is more relevant to 
horizontal diversification. 
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Perft+1 is the company’s financial performance in year t+1, measured as return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), or return on sales (ROS), all standardized by subtracting the 
industry median to isolate industrial effects. We also include one-year lagged performance 
(Perft) to control for the time-series correlation in performance. Other control variables are 
Size, Lev, MB, Age, and SOE, defined above. 
All of the variables in Equations 1 and 2 are defined in Appendix B. To mitigate the 
potential effect of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
regressions. The mean (median) of the DI is -0.056 (-0.023), which indicates that the sample 
companies tend to be centralized. This is consistent with the survey conducted by Bloom et al. 
(2012), which finds that companies incorporated in Asian countries are much more 
centralized than those incorporated in Europe. The relatively large standard deviation of DI 
shows that there is a wide variation in companies’ power structures, which is also consistent 
with previous research (Bloom et al., 2012). EU also varies widely among companies. The 
statistics for IQ show that most companies release their annual earnings within 70 to 110 days 
after the end of the fiscal year. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlations between all variables, with Pearson 
correlations above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations below. As predicted by 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, EU is positively correlated with DI, and IQ is negatively associated with 
DI, which provides preliminary support for the relation between power structure and 
environmental factors. The correlations among the independent variables do not present a 
significant multicollinearity problem. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 presents annual and industrial statistics for DI. Panel A shows that DI is 
decreasing over time, suggesting an increasing trend toward centralized decision-making.13 
Panel B shows that the allocation of decision rights from the parent company to the 
subsidiaries also varies across industries. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Robinson & 
Stocken, 2013), the transportation and public service industries tend to be more decentralized, 
whereas the mining and construction industries have a more centralized structure. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation 1 to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for environmental uncertainty (EU, 
Hypothesis 1) and internal information quality (IQ, Hypothesis 2) respectively, and column 3 
contains both. 
The coefficients of EU in columns 1 and 3 are significantly positive (0.053 and 0.055 
respectively; p <0.01), consistent with Hypothesis 1. Companies operating in a volatile and 
uncertain environment tend to allocate more decision rights to their subsidiaries, because 
local information and knowledge are important in such situations. 
The coefficients of IQ in columns 2 and 3 are negative and significant (-0.067 and 
-0.077 respectively; p <0.05 and 0.01 respectively), suggesting that good internal information 
ensures effective communication between a parent company and its subsidiaries, and allows 
the parent company to obtain accurate and timely information for decision-making. Therefore, 
                                                                 
13 In untabulated analyses, we explore whether the pattern of DI is associated with newly listed companies, market volatility, 
easier communication within the group, or adoption of the new accounting standards in 2007, and find that the latter two 
factors appear to have driven the increasing centralization.  
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a centralized power structure is observed. The evidence supports Hypothesis 2. 
The results for the control variables indicate that companies that are larger (Size), with a 
higher leverage ratio (Lev), and lower growth opportunity (MB) tend to be centralized, 
whereas older (Age),14 state-owned (SOE), and diversified (Diversify) companies are more 
decentralized. We also observe a decrease in DI with the implementation of new accounting 
standards (After). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Hypothesis 3. Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation 2 to test Hypothesis 3.15 
Using one-year-ahead ROA, ROE, or ROS as the dependent variable, the coefficients on AbDI 
are negative and significant, ranging from -0.005 to -0.026, with p ranging from slightly less 
than 0.10 to 0.05. The results suggest that future performance decreases with the extent of the 
mismatch between the level of decentralization and environmental factors, supporting 
Hypothesis 3. Specifically, the agency cost of overdecentralization and the communication 
cost due to overcentralization may both contribute to poor performance (Jensen & Meckling, 
1992; Bloom et al., 2012). In the next section, we conduct further analyses to determine 
whether overdecentralization or overcentralization or both contribute to poor performance. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Additional Analyses 
In this section, we conduct several additional analyses to ensure the robustness of the 
main findings. 
                                                                 
14 We also include the interaction between EU and Age. Untabulated results show that the main effect of EU remains  
positively significant; and this positive effect decreases when the company grows older (negative coefficient on EU*Age).  
Thanks for the reviewer’s suggestion. 
15 As we need one-year-ahead performance variables (ROA, etc.) in Equation 2, the sample for this regression includes only 
13,770 firm-years. 
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Further Analyses on DI 
Relative efficiency of the parent company and its subsidiaries. It is possible that DI 
is driven by the relative efficiency of the parent company and its subsidiaries. If the asset 
turnover ratio is higher in the parent company, DI will point to a more centralized structure. 
However, the concern can be mitigated for the following reasons. First, our alternative 
measures of decentralization, described below in the “Alternative Measures of the Main 
Variables” section, are based on investment activities and thus not contaminated by relative 
operating efficiency within the group. The results based on these measures, reported in Table 
6, also support our predictions. Second, we try to isolate the effect of the relative efficiency 
of the parent company by controlling for the industry efficiency in the analyses. For each year, 
we first calculate the relative efficiency of the group company by dividing the parent 
company’s asset turnover over consolidated asset turnover, and then use the industry mean of 
this ratio in a particular year, denoted as Ind_RelEff, to capture industry relative efficiency. 
The asset turnover ratio is defined as sales divided by operating assets. The results after 
controlling Ind_RelEff are displayed in Panel A of Table 5. We can see that the main 
inferences remain unchanged. 
 
Parent company without operating activities. DI is mainly based on the allocation of 
decision rights about operating activities between the parent company and its subsidiaries. 
Some parent companies, however, are purely investment entities that do not engage in any 
operating activities. DI cannot capture control if it is through funding or other non-operating 
channels, and thus may not be an appropriate measure for investment-oriented parent 
companies. 
To address this concern, we exclude group companies that do not report any sales 
revenue on the parent company’s financial statements, and re-estimate Equation 1 based on 
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the reduced sample of groups with only operation-oriented parent companies. Panel B of 
Table 5 shows that our conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
Relative scale of the parent company and its subsidiaries. The operation of the parent 
company relative to its subsidiaries is associated with their relative scale. We therefore adjust 
DI, by subtracting the assets owned by the parent company relative to the subsidiaries. With 
this adjustment, we classify a group whose parent company retains more operating activities 
(purchase or sales) relative to its operating resources (i.e., assets) as having a more 
centralized structure. 
To further ensure that the results are not driven by the size of the parent company 
relative to its subsidiaries, we partition the sample according to Rel_scale, defined as the 
operating assets owned by the parent company divided by the consolidated assets, and run 
subsample regressions. The results in Panel C of Table 5 are very similar in the two 
subsamples, which helps mitigate concerns about potential noise due to the relative size of 
the parent company. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Alternative Measures of the Main Variables 
Decentralization of investment decisions. As mentioned earlier, DI as used in this 
study only considers companies’ decisions about operating activities, which could introduce 
some potential noise into our main inferences. Investment and financing decisions are not 
covered by DI. As a robustness check, we construct two alternative measures: 
decentralization of investment activities, denoted as DIinv1 and DIinv2. 
According to the new accounting standards adopted by China in 2007, listed companies 
are required to disclose “income from investments in associates and joint ventures” in both 
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the consolidated and the parent company’s financial statements. As investing companies have 
high ownership and can exercise significant influence on associates and joint ventures, the 
equity method is used to record such investment in consolidated financial statements.16 
Meanwhile, investment in subsidiaries is recorded using cost methods in the parent 
company’s financial statements, i.e., the earnings of subsidiaries are not recorded by the 
parent company. Therefore, the difference in “investment income from associates and joint 
ventures” reported by the group and the parent company can represent the subsidiaries’ 
investment income, or indicate whether the subsidiaries have investment. 
We construct DIinv1 based on this information. When a parent company (or its 
subsidiaries) has a non-zero “income from investment in associates and joint ventures,” we 
assume that the parent company (or its subsidiaries) has investment in associates and joint 
ventures.17 If only the subsidiaries have investment in associates and joint ventures, the 
group company allocates all decision rights on investment to its subsidiaries and DIinv1 is 
coded as 3; if only the parent company has such investment, the group centralizes the 
decision rights in the headquarters and DIinv1 is coded as 1; if both the parent company and 
its subsidiaries have such investment, DIinv1 is coded as 2. If companies do not have such 
investment in either the parent company or its subsidiaries, we drop these observations.  
Next, we estimate Equation 1 using DIinv1 as the dependent variable. We use an ordinal 
logistic regression model based on the reduced sample after the implementation of the new 
accounting standards, excluding the companies that do not report investments in associates 
and joint ventures. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. Similar to the results in 
Table 3, the coefficient on EU is significantly positive (0.695, p <0.001), and the coefficient 
                                                                 
16 The equity method recognizes the investor’s share of investee income,  and the investor’s declared share of investee 
dividends is recorded as decreases in the investment account. 
17 Regarding the importance of investment in associates, we find that on average, the income from such investment accounts 
for 12.47% of the whole group’s net income. Thus, investment in associates comprises a relatively significant part of the 
group’s operations. 
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on IQ is significantly negative (-1.063, p = 0.027). 
We also construct another variable for decentralization based on capital investment, 
denoted as DIinv2.18 We use capital expenditure, defined as cash paid for purchase of 
intangible assets and PPE (property, plant, and equipment), as the measure of investment. We 
calculate the measure as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑣2 = −
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
 
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the allocation of decision rights for capital investment is 
positively related to external environmental volatility (EU), and negatively associated with 
internal information quality (IQ). Hence, the main inferences remain unchanged based on 
DIinv1 and DIinv2. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
External environmental uncertainty. Following Mason and Fredrickson (2001), we 
construct an alternative proxy for external environmental uncertainty, denoted as EU2, which 
eliminates the temporal trend of sales. For each firm-year, we regress sales in the five 
previous years against time. EU2 is then measured as the standard error of the regression 
coefficient divided by average sales over the five-year period.19 
As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the coefficient of EU2 is 0.079 (p = 0.013), which is 
consistent with the results based on EU in the main analyses. 
 
Internal information quality. Following Gallemore and Labro (2015), we use internal 
control quality as another proxy for internal information quality, denoted as IQ2. Companies 
with material weaknesses of internal control have to make decisions based on low-quality 
                                                                 
18 We thank the reviewer for the suggestion about alternative measures of decentralization. 
19 To mitigate the effect of survivor bias, we use all available data to calculate EU2 if companies have been listed for less 
than five years. 
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financial information. Furthermore, business units report information to the headquarters in 
an untimely and inaccurate manner (Feng, Li, & McVay, 2009). If a company reports a 
material weakness, it is likely that the quality of internal information is low. 
Before 2007, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges did not require listed 
companies to report internal control self-assessments or to hire auditors to verify their reports 
(Sun, Yi, & Lin, 2012). Therefore, internal control data are only available after 2007, which 
makes the sample size much smaller (7,249). 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that the coefficient of IQ2 is -0.051 (p = 0.018), which is 
consistent with the results based on IQ in the main analyses.20 Furthermore, the results 
(untabulated) still hold if we use both EU2 and IQ2 in Equation 1. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Subsample Regressions 
We run the regression of Equation 1 with different subsamples to check the robustness 
of the results. 
New Chinese accounting standards. The new accounting standards introduced in 
China in 2007 substantially changed the requirements for the preparation of financial 
statements for a group company and its parent company. To address the potential influence of 
this exogenous event on information quality and then DI, we estimate Equation 1 using 
subsamples from before and after 2007. The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that the 
coefficients of EU are significant and positive for both time periods, whereas IQ is 
significantly and negatively associated with DI in the 2002 to 2006 period, and only 
marginally significant in the post-2007 period. Therefore, the main inferences remain 
unchanged despite the change in accounting standards. 
                                                                 
20 There were no mandatory requirements for internal control reports for Chinese listed companies before 2010 (Sun et al., 
2012). Thus, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
22 
 
 
State-owned companies. Table 3 shows that state-owned enterprises tend to be 
decentralized (0.030, p <0.001), consistent with the findings of Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2013). 
That is, state-owned companies tend to extend the layers of their pyramidal structure to 
insulate them from political interference. We examine whether state-owned companies show 
a different pattern from that of private companies, as a result of political interference. 
As illustrated in Panel B of Table 8, the coefficient of the interaction term EU*SOE is 
not statistically significant, indicating that environmental uncertainty has a similar effect on 
power structure for both state-owned and private companies. However, the effect of internal 
information quality varies between the two types of company (IQ*SOE): internal information 
quality is far more important for state-owned enterprises than for private companies. One 
possible explanation is that state-owned companies tend to decentralize more to avoid 
political influence (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2013), and thus better communication is needed 
between the parent company and its subsidiaries to reduce information loss. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The Endogeneity Issue 
There may be some concerns over reverse causality regarding the effect of internal 
information quality on decentralization.21 That is, centralized companies may be more likely 
to make earnings announcements earlier due to their low organizational complexity (Jennings 
et al., 2014). We use one-year lagged IQ in Equation 1 to address this concern, and the 
untabulated results remain the same. Furthermore, we run a two-stage regression to alleviate 
the endogeneity concern. We choose two-year lagged IQ as the instrumental variable, because 
the speed of a company’s earnings announcement two years ago may not be affected by its 
                                                                 
21 We are less concerned about the endogeneity problem for external environmental uncertainty, because we use the previous 
five years’ data to construct this variable. 
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power structure in the current year. 
Specifically, in stage one we regress concurrent IQ on the two-year lagged IQ to 
estimate the predicted IQ in the current year. In the second stage, we regress DI on the 
estimated IQ. We include the same control variables as in Equation 1 for both stages. Panel A 
of Table 9 shows that the results of the second stage regression are the same as those in Table 
3. 
However, decentralization is a relatively stable arrangement within a group and lagged 
variables may not fully solve the endogeneity problem.22 In the earlier part of this paper, we 
also use the mandatory adoption of IFRS-convergent accounting standards in 2007 to address 
this problem. Adoption of the standards is an exogenous event and has a positive effect on 
internal information (e.g., Liu at al., 2011). As in Table 3, we find a significantly negative 
coefficient on After (the indicator for the period after the adoption), indicating that a better 
information environment decreases the level of decentralization. 
To further address this issue, we use the adoption of the ERP (enterprise resource 
planning) system as an alternative proxy for internal information quality. As Zeng, Wang, and 
Xu (2012) discuss, the adoption of the ERP system in the early 2000s was primarily 
promoted by the Chinese government under the plan of “Industrialization with Information 
Technology,” and is generally exogenous. Such systems can improve top management’s 
access to decision-relevant internal information and thus lead to a better internal information 
environment (Dorantes et al., 2013). 
We use hand-collected data from 2002 to 2006 about whether and when companies 
adopted ERP system. We construct a dummy variable ERP, which takes the value of one if 
the company has ERP system in a specific year and zero otherwise. We find that ERP is 
significantly negative, suggesting that higher internal information quality leads to a more 
                                                                 
22 Thanks for the reviewer’s suggestion. 
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concentrated structure. The results are consistent with our hypothesis (Panel B of Table 9). 
We acknowledge that despite our best efforts, the potential endogeneity problem has not 
been fully addressed. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The Effects of Overdecentralization and Overcentralization on Future Performance 
Table 4 shows that companies with suboptimal power structure have weak future 
performance. Previous theoretical studies have revealed that inappropriate decentralization 
increases agency costs due to conflicts of interest between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries, whereas overcentralization leads to growing communication costs or 
information loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Dessein, 2002; Bloom et al., 2012). 
Therefore, we may need to explore whether the effect on performance of an 
inappropriate power structure varies between overdecentralization and overcentralization. To 
do so, we extend Equation 2 and run the following model. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4Controls𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
AbDIpos, representing overdecentralization, is the absolute value of the residuals from 
Equation 1 if the residuals are positive, and zero otherwise. AbDIneg, representing 
overcentralization, is the absolute value of the residuals from Equation 1 if the residuals are 
negative, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined as above.  
Untabulated analyses show that the mean of AbDIpos is 0.137, and that of AbDIneg is 
0.175. Table 10 reports that the performance of overdecentralized companies is significantly 
weaker than that of overcentralized companies, as the coefficients on AbDIpos are 
significantly negative, and those on AbDIneg are insignificant. The results suggest that 
companies that overdelegate decision rights to their subsidiaries experience greater agency 
costs due to conflicts of interest, whereas the information loss due to overcentralization is not 
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that substantial. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
We try to explore the insignificant relation between overcentralization (AbDIneg) and 
performance. The negative effect of overcentralization is primarily due to the information 
loss under centralization, which we conjecture may vary across companies. Gallemore and 
Labro (2015) suggest that the effect of internal information quality is stronger for companies 
with greater coordination needs. Because large companies tend to have more complicated 
business (Grossmann, 2007) and thus greater coordination needs, the negative effect of 
information loss due to overcentralization may be stronger for such companies. To test this 
conjecture, we perform the analysis with a sample of companies of relatively larger size (top 
30% of total assets). Untabulated results show that overcentralization only leads to an adverse 
effect on future performance for large firms. 
 
Conclusions 
We use more than a decade’s data on China’s A-share listed companies to examine the 
relation between environmental factors and decentralization. We find that group companies 
operating in volatile business environments tend to allocate more decision rights to their 
subsidiaries because local knowledge is more valuable in such companies, whereas the 
groups that have high-quality internal information are more centralized due to effective 
communication within the group. Furthermore, a mismatch between power structure and 
environmental factors harms future performance, especially in cases of overdecentralization. 
This paper suggests that environmental factors are important determinants of power 
structure, and a mismatch in this regard can reduce future profitability and thus hurt the 
interest of stockholders.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean StdDev Min Median Max 
DI -0.056 0.220 -0.747 -0.023 0.523 
AbDI 0.154 0.143 0.000 0.108 0.836 
EU 0.317 0.216 0.032 0.268 1.217 
IQ -0.247 0.060 -0.329 -0.247 -0.077 
Size 21.650 1.178 19.240 21.51 25.330 
Lev 0.486 0.196 0.062 0.497 0.904 
MB 3.398 3.089 0.662 2.441 20.710 
Age 2.483 0.415 1.386 2.565 3.219 
SOE 0.555 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Diversify 0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
After 0.682 0.466 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 0.000 0.056 -0.275 0.000 0.182 
ROE -0.019 0.175 -1.229 0.000 0.334 
ROS -0.004 0.166 -1.162 0.000 0.536 
This table reports descriptive statistics based on 16,062 observations over the period from 2002 to 2013. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Cont’) 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 DI AbDI EU IQ Size Lev MB Age SOE Diversify After ROA ROE ROS 
DI 1.000 -0.220** 0.056** -0.011 -0.134** -0.078** 0.052** 0.008 0.045** 0.068** -0.123** -0.031** -0.045** -0.039** 
AbDI -0.026** 1.000 0.015 -0.016* -0.007 0.047** 0.019* 0.01 -0.053** 0.029** 0.027** -0.044** -0.037** -0.035** 
EU 0.047** 0.044** 1.000 0.049** 0.074** 0.177** 0.137** 0.072** -0.015 0.060** -0.054** 0.073** 0.074** -0.011 
IQ -0.015 -0.01 0.054** 1.000 -0.023** -0.058** 0.034** -0.085** 0.037** -0.031** -0.046** 0.218** 0.194** 0.169** 
Size -0.149** -0.041** 0.132** 0.004 1.000 0.317** -0.330** 0.159** 0.257** 0.067** 0.234** 0.112** 0.153** 0.112** 
Lev -0.083** 0.034** 0.196** -0.071** 0.321** 1.000 0.125** 0.189** 0.147** 0.103** -0.025** -0.339** -0.214** -0.292** 
MB 0.049** 0.044** 0.095** 0.044** -0.377** -0.003 1.000 0.073** -0.097** -0.039** 0.171** -0.020* -0.134** -0.070** 
Age 0.011 0.017*  0.032** -0.081** 0.186** 0.179** 0.019* 1.000 0.046** 0.183** 0.379** -0.073** -0.040** -0.034** 
SOE 0.052** -0.050** 0.004 0.052** 0.249** 0.142** -0.140** 0.040** 1.000 0.001 -0.095** -0.042** -0.016* -0.016* 
Diversify 0.068** 0.036** 0.071** -0.030** 0.071** 0.102** -0.035** 0.183** 0.001 1.000 0.028** -0.040** -0.004 -0.025** 
After -0.115** 0.007 -0.074** -0.030** 0.233** -0.020* 0.216** 0.399** -0.095** 0.028** 11.000 0.055** 0.057** 0.086** 
ROA -0.021** -0.041** 0.120** 0.253** 0.077** -0.364** 0.117** -0.110** -0.068** -0.050** 0.008 1.000 0.832** 0.783** 
ROE -0.056** -0.046** 0.202** 0.257** 0.181** -0.074** 0.144** -0.067** -0.035** -0.023** 0.0110 0.895** 1.000 0.716** 
ROS -0.034** -0.041** 0.062** 0.210** 0.034** -0.391** 0.088** -0.095** -0.110** -0.053** 0.018* 0.816** 0.704** 1.000 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. * and ** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 5%, and 
1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 2. Sample Distribution of Decentralization Index (DI) 
 
Panel A: By Year 
Year N Mean Median 
2002 881 -0.006 -0.004 
2003 960 -0.002 -0.004 
2004 1,027 -0.011 -0.003 
2005 1,100 -0.018 -0.004 
2006 1,145 -0.040 -0.013 
2007 1,229 -0.049 -0.019 
2008 1,334 -0.062 -0.025 
2009 1,373 -0.067 -0.023 
2010 1,476 -0.070 -0.033 
2011 1,734 -0.080 -0.034 
2012 1,863 -0.085 -0.039 
2013 1,940 -0.091 -0.050 
 
Panel B: By Industry 
Industry N Mean Median 
Agriculture (A) 339 0.022 0.019 
Mining (B) 361 -0.162 -0.111 
Manufacturing (C) 9,526 -0.066 -0.031 
Electricity, Gas, and Water (D) 621 -0.080 -0.056 
Construction (E) 363 -0.163 -0.114 
Transportation and Warehousing (F) 630 0.031 0.018 
Information Technology (G) 1,001 0.011 0.007 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (H) 1,084 -0.089 -0.047 
Real Estate (J) 803 -0.052 -0.014 
Public Services (K) 484 0.026 0.013 
Communication and Media (L) 124 0.001 -0.006 
Others (M) 726 -0.010 -0.004 
This table presents sample distribution of DI by year (2002-2013) and industry. Industry classification 
follows Industrial Classification Codes for Listed Companies (Edition 2001).  
  
31 
 
Table 3. External Environmental Uncertainty, Internal Information Quality, and 
Decentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable DI DI DI 
EU 0.053***  0.055*** 
 (6.51)  (6.65) 
IQ  -0.067** -0.077*** 
  (-2.39) (-2.73) 
Size -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (-7.67) (-6.94) (-7.64) 
Lev -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.079*** 
 (-7.51) (-7.20) (-7.69) 
MB 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (4.13) (5.35) (4.24) 
Age 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 (7.66) (7.93) (7.52) 
SOE 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
 (7.93) (7.53) (8.03) 
Diversify 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (8.21) (8.35) (8.21) 
After -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.059*** 
 (-6.05) (-6.32) (-6.09) 
Constant 0.268*** 0.232*** 0.249*** 
 (6.34) (5.41) (5.80) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,062 16,062 16,062 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.082 0.085 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 4. Suboptimal Decentralization and Future Performance  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables ROA t+1 ROE t+1 ROS t+1 
AbDI -0.005* -0.026*** -0.015* 
 (-1.91) (-2.64) (-1.68) 
ROA 0.469***   
 (58.05)   
ROE  0.267***  
  (29.14)  
ROS   0.312*** 
   (37.43) 
Size 0.007*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 
 (14.22) (16.16) (14.55) 
Lev -0.044*** -0.129*** -0.161*** 
 (-16.25) (-14.25) (-19.52) 
MB 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (17.90) (14.01) (15.88) 
Age -0.005*** -0.020*** -0.011*** 
 (-4.33) (-4.83) (-3.09) 
SOE -0.001* -0.007** 0.001 
 (-1.67) (-2.33) (0.35) 
Constant -0.129*** -0.524*** -0.431*** 
 (-12.48) (-14.37) (-13.35) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,770 13,770 13,770 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.115 0.178 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 5. Environmental Uncertainty, Information Quality, and Decentralization: 
Further Tests on DI Measures 
 
Panel A: Controlling Ind_RelEff 
Dependent Variable DI 
EU 0.055*** 
 (6.73) 
IQ -0.078*** 
 (-2.75) 
Ind_RelEff -0.007*** 
 (-3.37) 
Control variables Included 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,062 
Adjusted R2 0.085 
 
Panel B: Subsample Regression Deleting Parent Companies without Operating 
Activities 
Dependent Variable DI 
EU 0.054*** 
 (6.46) 
IQ -0.076*** 
 (-2.66) 
Control variables Included 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observations 15,915 
Adjusted R2 0.085 
 
Panel C: Subsample Analyses based on Relative Scale  
 High Rel_scale Low Rel_scale 
Dependent Variable DI DI 
EU 0.128*** 0.055*** 
 (11.26) (4.80) 
IQ -0.093*** -0.103** 
 (-2.83) (-2.37) 
Control variables Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 8,034 8,028 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.090 
High (Low) Rel_scale includes the companies with Rel_scale equal to or higher than (lower than) 
annual median. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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Table 6. Environmental Uncertainty, Information Quality, and Decentralization: 
Alternative Measures of DI 
 
Panel A: DIinv1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable DIinv1 DIinv1 DIinv1 
EU 0.695***  0.695*** 
 (5.43)  (5.43) 
IQ  -1.061** -1.063** 
  (-2.21) (-2.21) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,831 5,831 5,831 
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.039 0.041 
Results of ordinal logistic regression of Equation 1 with DIinv1 as dependent variable are presented. 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Panel B: DIinv2 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable DIinv2 DIinv2 DIinv2 
EU 0.170***  0.172*** 
 (12.75)  (12.89) 
IQ  -0.107** -0.139*** 
  (-2.33) (-3.02) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,904 15,904 15,904 
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.148 0.156 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 7. Environmental Uncertainty, Information Quality, and Decentralizatio n: 
Alternative Measures of Variables of Interest 
 
Panel A: Environmental Uncertainty 
Dependent Variable DI 
EU2 0.079** 
 (2.47) 
IQ -0.074** 
 (-2.41) 
Control variables Included 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observations 13,916 
Adjusted R2 0.079 
 
Panel B: Internal Information Quality 
Dependent Variable DI 
EU 0.064*** 
 (5.22) 
IQ2 -0.051** 
 (-2.37) 
Control variables Included 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observations 7,249 
Adjusted R2 0.083 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 8. Environmental Uncertainty, Information Quality, and Decentralization: 
Subsample Regressions 
 
Panel A: Different Time Periods 
 Year 2002-2006 Year 2007-2013 
Dependent Variable DI DI 
EU 0.068*** 0.049*** 
 (4.64) (4.91) 
IQ -0.137*** -0.052 
 (-2.91) (-1.47) 
Control variables Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 5,113 10,949 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.077 
 
Panel B: SOEs and Non-SOEs 
 SOE Non-SOE Full Sample 
Dependent Variable DI DI DI 
EU 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 
 (5.32) (3.64) (4.43) 
EU*SOE   0.008 
   (0.50) 
IQ -0.172*** 0.038 0.021 
 (-4.54) (0.91) (0.51) 
IQ*SOE   -0.189*** 
   (-3.38) 
SOE   -0.019 
   (-1.27) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,912 7,150 16,062 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.093 0.085 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 9. Environmental Uncertainty, Information Quality, and Decentralization:  
Endogeneity Issues 
 
Panel A: Two-stage Regression 
 First Stage Second Stage 
Dependent Variables IQ DI 
IQ t-2 0.283***  
 (33.35)  
EU 0.005** 0.044*** 
 (2.05) (4.42) 
IQ  -0.366*** 
  (-3.18) 
Control variables Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,753 11,753 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.075 
 
Panel B: ERP Adoption 
Dependent Variable DI 
EU 0.063*** 
 (4.31) 
ERP -0.029*** 
 (-3.58) 
Control variables Included 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Observations 5,113 
Adjusted R2 0.074 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 10. Suboptimal Decentralization and Future Performance: Overdecentralization 
and Overcentralization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables ROA t+1 ROE t+1 ROS t+1 
AbDIpos -0.015*** -0.073*** -0.048*** 
 (-3.91) (-5.37) (-3.98) 
AbDIneg -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.18) (-0.28) (0.18) 
ROA 0.468***   
 (57.90)   
ROE  0.265***  
  (28.92)  
ROS   0.311*** 
   (37.28) 
Control variables Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,770 13,770 13,770 
Adjusted R2 0.308 0.116 0.179 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate signif icance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Appendix A. DI and Different Power Structures 
 
    
Group 1- all 
external sales 
by the parent 
Group 2 - most 
external sales 
by the parent 
Group 3 - 50% 
external sales 
by the parent 
and 50% by 
the 
subsidiaries  
Group 4 - all 
external sales 
by the 
subsidiaries 
    Parent Sub. Parent Sub. Parent Sub. Parent Sub. 
External 
Buy $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 $ 200 
Sales  500  0  375  125  250  250  0  500 
Internal 
Buy  250  0  125  0  0  0  0  250 
Sales  0  250  0  125  0  0  250  0 
Parent 
Expense 450 325 200 200 
Sales 500 375 250 250 
Consolidated 
Expense 400 400 400 400 
Sales 500 500 500 500 
DI -0.56 -0.28 0 0 
 
As shown in the table, we assume that there are four groups whose parent company and 
subsidiaries both have the capacity to processing $200 external purchases, and the external 
selling price for these purchases is $250. Thus, the normal purchase (sales) volume for the 
parent company and its subsidiaries is both $200 ($250). Each group has $400 consolidated 
purchases and $500 consolidated sales. The relative assets within the group are also the same 
across the groups. 
 
Group 1: External sales are completely concentrated in the parent company (the subsidiaries 
only making internal sales to the parent). 
Group 2: External sales are mostly concentrated in the parent company (the subsidiaries 
selling a half to the parent, and a half to the market). 
Group 3: External sales are not concentrated in e ither the parent company or the subsidiaries 
(no internal transactions). 
Group 4: External sales are completely concentrated in the subsidiary companies (the parent 
only making internal sales to the subsidiaries). 
For group 1 and 2, external sales are concentrated toward the parent company and the 
degree of concentration changes in a descending order. We can see that DI can correctly 
show group 1 is more concentrated than group 2, and they both are more concentrated than 
group 3 where there is no concentration.  
For group 4, external sales are concentrated toward the subsidiary companies, and thus it 
is more decentralized than group 3. Nonetheless, DI does not distinguish these two groups. 
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
DI Decentralization index of operating activities. 
DIinv1 Decentralization index of investing activities. 
DIinv2 Decentralization index of capital investment.  
EU Environmental uncertainty, defined as the coefficient of variation in sales 
over the prior five years ending in current year. 
EU2 Environmental uncertainty, equal to the standard error of the coefficient 
from regressing sales against time over the previous five-year period, 
divided by average sales for the same period.  
IQ Internal information quality, defined as earnings announcement speed, 
which is the number of days between the end of fiscal year and earnings 
announcement date, divided by 365 and multiplied by minus one. 
IQ2 Internal information quality, equal to one if the company did not report a 
material weakness in current fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
ERP Indicator for ERP system, equal to one if the company has ERP system in a 
specific year and zero otherwise. 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Lev Total liabilities divided by the total assets. 
MB Market-to-book ratio, equal to market value of common equity divided by 
book value of equity. 
Age Natural logarithm of the number of years that the company has been in 
business. 
SOE Indicator for state-owned companies, equal to one for state-owned 
companies and zero otherwise. 
Diversify Indicator for diversified companies, equal to one for companies having sales 
in two or more industries, and zero otherwise. 
After Indicator for the adoption of new accounting standards in 2007, equal to one 
for the years later than 2007 (inclusive) and zero otherwise. 
Ind_RelEff Industry mean of relative efficiency of parent company and its subsidiaries, 
and relative efficiency is calculated as parent’s asset turnover divided by 
consolidated asset turnover. 
Rel_scale Relative size of parent company, defined as operating assets owned by 
parent company divided by the consolidated assets. 
ROA Return on assets, equal to net income divided by total assets. 
ROE Return on equity, equal to net income divided by shareholders’ equity. 
ROS Return on sales, equal to net income divided by sales. 
AbDI Suboptimal decentralization, equal to the absolute value of residuals from 
Equation 1. 
AbDIpos Overdecentralization, equal to the absolute value of residuals from Equation 
1 if residuals are positive, and zero otherwise. 
AbDIneg Overcentralization, equal to the absolute value of residuals from Equation 1 
if residuals are negative, and zero otherwise. 
 
